In most cases, it is not enough to simply point out that a prejudicial error has occurred.  The appellant must thoroughly discuss how the error is prejudicial in the context of the case.

In Santina v. General Petroleum Corp. (1940) 41 Cal.App.2d 74, the court discussed this burden:

“Where any error is relied on for a reversal it is not sufficient for appellant to point to the error and rest there. Since the appellate court must affirmatively find prejudice such finding must be based either upon the facts found in the record or upon the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. In the face of the constitutional limitation there is no room for the presumption that prejudice results from the fact of error alone. The fact of prejudice is just as essential as the fact of error.”

(Id. at p. 77.)

As noted in Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, the court’s duty to examine the entire record arises only after the appellant has fulfilled his or her duty to make an argument establishing prejudice.  “Because of the need to consider the particulars of a given case, rather than the type of error, the appellant bears the duty of spelling out in his brief exactly how the error caused a miscarriage of justice.”  (Id. at p. 106.) 

In Pool v. City of Oakland (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1051, the court quoted from Seaman’s Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. (1984) 36 Cal.3d 752, 770, (overruled on other grounds in Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Co. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 85): “‘[A] ‘miscarriage of justice’ should be declared only when the court, ‘after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,’  is of the ‘opinion’ that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ ”  (Id. at p. 1069.)  More specific language can be found in cases dealing with the specific error involved, i.e., jury argument, instruction, exclusion or admission of evidence, etc.  Seaman also acknowledged, “The test is ‘necessarily [ ] based upon reasonable probabilities rather than upon mere possibilities; otherwise the entire purpose of the constitutional provision would be defeated.”  (Id. at p. 770.)