Pursuing an appeal based on lack of substantial evidence

Appealing on the ground that the judgment  is not supported by substantial evidence is often unsuccessful, but that doesn’t mean an appellant is without hope.  The attack should not be based on the quantity of evidence but rather the quality of it.  As noted in Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, the appellate court was not meant “‘merely to echo the determinations of the trial court.  A decision supported by a mere scintilla of evidence need not be affirmed on review.’”  (Id. at p. 1633.) 

Kuhn also notes that it is not enough to have ány evidence supporting the judgment; it must be “reasonable . . . , credible, and of solid value. . . The ultimate determination is whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found for the respondent based on the whole record.”  (Id. at p. 1633.)  Kuhn also includes inferences as does In re Estate of Young (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 62, 76 [court distinguishes between inferences based on “logic and reason,” rather than “mere speculation or conjecture.’”]

 What this means for the appellant is that if the respondent has prevailed based on evidence that is not reasonable, the appellant must state facts showing the unreasonableness of the testimony. For instance, if a single witness testifies to what he or she observed, then contrary facts showing either the witness could never have observed those facts or wasn’t even in the same location must be in the record.  This requires a showing that the evidence is “inherently improbable” or “implausible” so that the falsity or impossibility of the evidence is apparent. (Evje v. City Title Ins. Co. (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 488, 492.) 

Simply rearguing the weight of the evidence will not satisfy this standard.

What is substantial evidence?

What is considered substantial evidence?  We have been told that “[s]ubstantial evidence” must be “of ponderable legal significance, . . . reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value . . . ‘Obviously the word cannot be deemed synonymous with ‘any’ evidence.’”  (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873.)  Moreover, in resolving appeals based on this ground, the courts will look to the entire record, and not just to evidence that is favorable to the appellant or isolated from a consideration of the record as a whole.  (Ibid.)

 In my opinion, the term “substantial evidence” is not accurate.  To say that substantial evidence supports the judgment implies a weighing or that the quantity of evidence is somehow significant.  We know that is not always the case.  Juries are often instructed that they can believe one witness over a multitude of witnesses.  What matters is that there is credible evidence to support the decision.

An appeal on this ground also should avoid examining the evidence with a focus on credibility, because that is the function of the trier of fact and not the appellate courts.  Clients will often complain that a witness has lied but unless that lie can be affirmatively established on the record, the jury is entitled to believe who it wants.  (Tupman v. Haberkern (1929) 208 Cal. 256, 261; In re Marriage of Ananeh-Firempong (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 272, 278.)

Nor does it matter that the appellate court considered the evidence and had they been the triers of fact, they might have ruled in another way or even found there was substantial evidence to support a different decision.  The appellate court cannot substitute its opinions and conclusions for those of the trier of fact.  (Bowers v. Bernards, supra, 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 874 [“If such substantial evidence can be found, it is of no consequence that the trial court believing other evidence, or drawing other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion.”]

On to the substantial evidence standard of review

The substantial evidence standard of review  applies when the appealable order or judgment involves the trial court’s determination of disputed fact issues.   It is frequently raised when a trial has been concluded and the jury or court found in favor of one party over the other based on the evidence presented.  This ground may also arise when the trial court or jury resolves any factual dispute. 

Simply stated, the appellate courts are bound by the trial court’s resolution of disputed factual issues and must affirm the judgment so long as the judgment is supported by “substantial evidence.”  (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.) 

Of all the standards of review, this standard is probably the weakest.  Reversals are rare, although not impossible, and as noted in Whiteley v. Philip Morris Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 635, 678, “[d]efendants raising a claim of insufficiency of the evidence assumes [sic] a daunting burden.”

Some final thoughts on abuse of discretion

      As you can tell, the appellate courts give considerable deference to the trial court in making discretionary rulings, especially when there are several permissible options available to the lower court.  This standard of review also presents a tough challenge on appeal, but as noted above, the chances of success are increased when the ruling goes outside applicable principles of law and results in a miscarriage of justice.  At the trial level, the attorney must show how the court’s ruling conflicts with those principles of law, and also, how the ruling will result in prejudicial error.

      In Estate of Gilkison (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1443, the court described a challenge based on abuse of discretion:

“An attorney who prosecutes an appeal from an order addressed to the trial court’s sound discretion is confronted with more than a daunting task.  This is an uphill battle which, absent unusual circumstances, may be equated with confederate General John Bell Hood’s attempt to capture ‘Little Round Top’ at the battle of Gettysburg in the Civil War.  General Hood did not succeed.”

(Id. at p. 1448.)

More on the abuse of discretion standard of review

Here's a comprehensive explanation of the abuse of discretion standard of review in Horsford v. Board of Trustees of State California University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 393:

“This description of the standard is complete, however, only if ‘beyond the bounds of reason’ is understood as something in addition to simply ‘irrational’ or ‘illogical.’  While an irrational decision would usually constitute an abuse of discretion the legal standard of review encompasses more than that:  ‘The scope of discretion always resides in the particular law being applied, i.e., in the ‘legal principles governing the subject of [the] action . . .’  Action that transgresses the confines of the applicable principles of law is outside the scope of discretion and we call such action an ‘abuse’ of discretion.’ . . . For example, a court could be mistaken about the scope of its discretion and the mistake could be entirely ‘reasonable’ – that is, it adopts a position about which reasonable judges could differ.  But a reasoned decision based on the reasonable view of the scope of discretion is still an abuse of judicial discretion when it starts from a mistaken premise, even though nothing about the exercise of discretion is, in ordinary-language use of the phrase, ‘beyond the bounds of reason.’ . . . In other words, judicial discretion must be measured against the general rules of law and, in the case of a statutory grant of discretion, against the specific law that grants the discretion.”

(Id. at p. 393; citations omitted.)  In simpler terms, “‘A trial court’s exercise of discretion will be upheld if it is based on a ‘reasoned judgment’ and complies with the ‘ . . . legal principles and policies appropriate to the particular matter at issue.’”  (Colur-Vue, Inc. v. Abrams (1996) 44 Cal. App.4th 1599, 1603.) 

          As you might guess, appellate attorneys generally prefer an independent review so that the appellate courts will pay less deference to the trial court's "reasoning."